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Biotechnology Patents and African Food Security: 
Aligning America’s Patent Policies and 
International Development Interests* 
Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford** 
Substantial improvement in agricultural productivity is 
essential for achieving sustainable food security and reducing 
chronic rural poverty in many developing countries, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Modern biotechnology, along with other 
important tools, can help solve some of the basic productivity 
problems that plague the millions of small-scale and 
subsistence farmers who are the backbone of African 
agriculture.  However, important components of the 
biotechnology tool kit—gene traits, plant transformation tools, 
and genetically improved germplasm—have been patented in 
the United States and elsewhere by companies that have little 
economic incentive to develop and disseminate the technology 
to meet the needs of these farmers.  This article analyzes how 
U.S. patent policy affects the development and dissemination of 
biotechnology to improve agriculture and food security in 
Africa, and the article makes the case for policy change.  
Patent policy is but one example of U.S. policies and 
government programs that affect food security and poverty 
reduction in developing countries and that deserve scrutiny.  
The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals aim to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, and they recognize the 
importance of developing country agriculture in achieving that 
objective.1  The United States has embraced these goals,2 but 
                                                          
 * This article is partly an encapsulation of some of the concepts and 
arguments presented in an article published by the Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology.  Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, 
Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 321 (2004). 
 ** Mr. Michael R. Taylor is a Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future 
(RFF).  Dr. Jerry Cayford is a Washington-based philosopher, public policy 
analyst, and former research associate at RFF. 
 1. The World Bank Group, Millennium Development Goals, at 
http://www.developmentgoals.org (last updated Sept. 23, 2003). 
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many policies of the United States are not fully aligned with 
the goals or with the critical need to improve developing 
country agriculture.3  This includes U.S. policies concerning 
agricultural subsidies, trade barriers, development assistance, 
and food aid.4  Nor does U.S. patent policy appear to be fully 
aligned with the goal of achieving global food security.5 
The U.S. government is a strong promoter of biotechnology 
as a tool for improving food security,6 and the U.S. patent 
system has enthusiastically embraced plant biotechnology 
through the issuance of thousands of patents.7  The United 
States is also a proponent of strong patent protection 
                                                          
 2. President Bush told a World Bank audience early in his term that a 
“world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race 
lives on less than $2 a day is neither just, nor stable.”  George W. Bush, 
Remarks by President Bush to the World Bank (July 17, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010717–1.html.  
Undersecretary of State for Business, Economic, and Agricultural Affairs, 
Alan Larson recently declared that “[f]ood security is a serious foreign policy 
concern that profoundly threatens human health, economic prosperity and 
political stability.”  Alan P. Larson, Undersecretary of State for Business, 
Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Address to the House Comm. on Int'l 
Relations (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.useu.be/Categories/ 
Sustainable% 20Development/Apr0103LarsonFoodSecurity.html. 
 3. For a recent and accessible overview of how agricultural, trade, and 
food aid policies of the United States and Europe adversely affect developing 
country agriculture and food security, see generally BREAD FOR THE WORLD 
INSTITUTE, AGRICULTURE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: HUNGER 2003 (Sandra 
Bunch ed., Mar. 2003), available at http://www.bread.org/institute/ 
hunger_report/2003-pdf.htm. 
 4. See generally id. 
 5. See id. at 84-85 (noting that the U.S. is seen to favor biotechnology 
and to represent the interests of multinational corporations). 
 6. At a June 2003 biotechnology conference in Washington, DC, for 
example, President Bush said, “For the sake of a continent threatened by 
famine [Africa], I urge the European governments to end their opposition to 
biotechnology.  We should encourage the spread of safe, effective biotechnology 
to win the fight against global hunger.”  BBC News, US in New Global GM 
Push, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3013394.stm (last updated June 23, 
2004); see also Press Release, USAID, CABIO: Mobilizing Science and 
Technology to Reduce Poverty and Hunger (June 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2003/fs030623_1.html. 
 7. See Gregory Graff, The Sources of Biological Technologies for 
Agriculture: Public and Private Innovation and Patenting (Apr. 10, 2000) 
(presented at the AAEA NC208 Conference on "R&D Policies and Impacts," 
Univ. of California-Berkeley, Mar. 30-31, 2001) (on file with the Minnesota 
Journal of Law, Science & Technology); Bradford L. Barham et al., Trends in 
University Ag-Biotech Patent Production, 24 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 294 
(2002), available at http://www.biotech.wisc.edu/seebiotech/pdfs/ 
aefinalbbkk.pdf. 
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worldwide.8  It is thus important to explore how the U.S. stance 
in these three connected areas—biotechnology, patent policy, 
and the need for progress in developing country agriculture—
can be reconciled, and how food security and the broader 
international interests of the United States can be advanced 
through patent policy change. 
To address these questions, we analyze the U.S. patent 
system and patent policy as social constructs that are intended 
to benefit society by fostering useful innovation and whose 
performance is properly evaluated from the perspective of the 
social outcomes they achieve.  Under this approach, change in 
patent policy is justified if it would improve dissemination of 
the tools of agricultural biotechnology for important social 
purposes, such as improving food security in Africa, without 
significantly undercutting incentives for the invention of such 
tools. 
From this conceptual vantage point, we describe the 
privatization of research to improve seeds through plant 
biotechnology, domestic policies affecting access to patented 
technologies, and U.S. “foreign policy” on patents, including the 
U.S. stance on implementation of the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and other efforts to 
harmonize patent policy internationally.  We then analyze the 
impact of U.S. patent practices and policies on developing 
country access to biotechnology, present the case for change 
across a spectrum of domestic and foreign patent policies, and 
briefly analyze several possible policy changes. 
This article aims to stimulate thinking among 
policymakers and stakeholders about how U.S. patent policies 
affect the broader U.S. interest in poverty reduction and food 
security in Africa.  It suggests how patent policies might be 
changed to advance that interest.  The authors are neither pro-
patent nor anti-patent.  We assume that patents have played 
and will continue to play an important role in stimulating 
private investment in plant biotechnology.  Any change in U.S. 
patent policy must take account of the patent system’s goal of 
stimulating invention.  We do not claim to have the final 
                                                          
 8. PTO, A New Organization for a New Millennium: Performance and 
Accountability Report, Forward to 2000 PTO PERFORMANCE & 
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 17, [hereinafter A New Organization for a New 
Millennium], at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2000 (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2004). 
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answer on the ideal mix of policies in this complex area, but we 
find the case for policy change convincing. 
I. FOOD SECURITY, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY, 
AND THE PATENTING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
A common reality in many developing and food-insecure 
countries is that a large majority of the people depends on 
agriculture for their livelihood, directly or indirectly.  In sub-
Saharan Africa, seventy percent of the people are rural and 
largely agriculture-dependent.9  Although industrialization has 
fueled growth and hunger reduction in some Asian economies, 
it is generally recognized among experts that the poor countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa must improve their agriculture and food 
systems to achieve economic growth and food security.10  
Moreover, according to the World Bank, global food production 
will have to double by 2025 to meet rising demand.11 
The lack of effective and fair markets for surplus food 
production may be the greatest obstacle to improving 
agriculture and food security in developing countries.  Access to 
local, national, and international markets is necessary to 
provide farmers the incentive they need to risk their labor and 
capital on expanded production.  Effective markets require 
sound political, economic, and social institutions and policies, 
as well as transportation and other physical infrastructure, 
which are lacking in many developing countries.  Maintaining 
effective markets in developing countries will also require 
change in the agricultural and trade policies of the United 
States and other industrialized countries that distort market 
prices for staple commodities and create obstacles to developing 
country exports. 
Within this context, improving the productivity of farmers 
                                                          
 9. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP, GENDER, POVERTY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES tbl. 3.1 (2002-2003), at 
http://www.afdb.org/knowledge/statistics/statistics_indicators_gender/environ
ment/indicators_environment.htm. 
 10. Advances in agricultural science and technology will be an important 
factor in improving nutritional security and stimulating economic growth.  See 
WORLD BANK, AN INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT ON THE ROLE OF 
AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN REDUCING HUNGER AND 
IMPROVING RURAL LIVELIHOODS 4 (2002), at http://www.agassessment.org/ 
pdfs/roleofag.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 11. See WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND MONOGRAPH SERIES 12, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
FROM VISION TO ACTION 23 (1997). 
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is not by itself the solution to food security. It is, however, an 
important part of the picture, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
African farmers often face difficult growing conditions, and 
better access to the basic Green Revolution tools can play an 
important role in improving their productivity.  The Green 
Revolution promoted the use of irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, 
high-yield varieties, and the greater efficiencies of monoculture 
and large farm size.  While the result was dramatic increases 
in productivity, this was accompanied by fertilizer and 
pesticide runoff into surface waters, greater soil erosion, and 
other environmental costs.  With the environmental lessons of 
the Green Revolution in mind, many agricultural experts also 
believe that the tools of modern biotechnology (including the 
use of recombinant DNA technology to produce genetically 
modified plants) can play a role in solving developing country 
agronomic problems and increasing productivity.12  By building 
into the seed itself traits for drought and disease resistance, 
insect and other pest control, and improved yield under specific 
local growing conditions, biotechnology may enable farmers to 
increase their productivity without as much reliance on the 
external inputs that characterized the Green Revolution. 
Biotechnology cannot benefit African farmers, however, if 
they and those who would develop the technology specifically 
for developing country purposes cannot gain access.  This 
article focuses on the problem of access to biotechnology for 
developing country purposes.  The access problem arises from 
the recent shift of investment in agricultural innovation from 
the public sector to the private and the use of the patent system 
by biotechnology companies to protect their investments. 
Research breakthroughs in the use of recombinant DNA 
techniques to modify plants, coupled with the 1980 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty13 
sanctioning the patenting of living organisms made by humans, 
have spawned substantial investment in biotechnology by large 
agricultural chemical companies and small biotech startup 
                                                          
 12. See GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR 
ALL IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1999); see also ISMAIL SERAGELDIN & G.J. PERSLEY, 
PROMETHEAN SCIENCE: AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, THE ENVIRONMENT, 
AND THE POOR (2000), at www.ifpri.org/themes/biotech/sergeldi.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 13. 447 U.S. 303 (1980); see also Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
443, 444-47 (1985) (expanding the scope of what the PTO considered 
patentable biotechnologies from microorganisms to genetically modified 
plants). 
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companies, primarily in the United States and Europe.14  
Increased private investment in and patenting of biotechnology 
are producing significant changes in how agricultural 
innovation occurs, how it is paid for, and who controls it. 
For most of history, innovation in seed technology has been 
a freely shared or public good.15  Farmers developed higher 
yielding, better performing varieties and shared them with 
neighbors.  From its founding in 1862, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) has invested in research to develop 
improved seed. 16  Until 1925, the USDA’s largest budget item 
was a program that provided the latest seed free to farmers.17  
Only in the years following World War II did a large-scale 
private-sector seed industry develop in the United States and 
other industrialized countries based on hybridization 
technology. 18 
In most developing countries, seed innovations remain 
largely a public good.  Farmers produce, save, and share 
improved seed, and national and international agricultural 
research laboratories produce innovations in seed technology 
that are commonly distributed through public channels.  There 
are fledgling seed industries in developing countries that are 
marketing privately developed hybrids and serving as 
distribution channels for publicly developed seed innovation, 
but in many areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa, innovation 
remains largely a public enterprise and a public good.19 
Internationally, the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which is sponsored by the 
World Bank and funded largely by donor countries in the 
industrialized world, has played a leading role in seed 
innovation, and many of its laboratories are exploring the use 
of modern biotechnology to solve developing country agronomic 
                                                          
 14. See Graff, supra note 7; Bradford Barham et al., Trends in University 
Ag-Biotech Patent Production 24 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 294 (2002), available at 
http://www.biotech.wisc.edu/seebiotech/pdfs/raefinalbbkk.pdf. 
 15. See Nathan A. Busch, Jack and the Beanstalk: Property Rights in 
Genetically Modified Plants, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 10 (2002) 
(discussing the centralization of control of the germplasm base by the 
government which allowed for distribution of new varieties of seeds for all 
farmers). 
 16. Id. at 12-13. 
 17. Id. at 14. 
 18. Id. at 31. 
 19. Personal communication with Mark Condon, Vice President of 
International Marketing, American Seed Trade Association (Jan. 24, 2002). 
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problems.20 
With the advent of biotechnology and the availability of 
plant patents, the balance between the public and private 
sectors—in terms of research and control of technology—has 
shifted.21 Generally, public-sector plant breeding expenditures 
for field crops have been relatively flat for decades but “appear 
to have started to decline in real terms from the mid-1990s . . . .  
In contrast, private-sector plant breeding investment appears 
to have grown extremely rapidly” (perhaps by a factor of ten 
since 1960).22  Depending on what one measures, private 
expenditures appear to have passed public expenditures around 
1990.23  Measured in scientist years, though, private sector 
effort was more than double public effort by 1994.24 
The privatization of research affects the kinds of research 
done and products developed. Private companies have invested 
heavily in the technology and seed companies required to bring 
new products to market.25  To capture a return on this 
investment, they have focused their commercial efforts, 
including product development, on applications with mass 
appeal to farmers who can afford the technology.26  This 
economic reality creates a problem, however, because private-
sector holders of biotechnology patents have little or no 
                                                          
 20. For background on the CGIAR system, see Future Harvest, at 
http://www.futureharvest.org (last visited September 21, 2004); see also 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE POOR: AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (G.J. Persley & M.M. Lantin eds., 1999), 
available at www.cgiar.org/biotech/rep0100/contents.htm; Applied 
Biotechnology Ctr. at the Int’l Maize and Wheat Improvement Ctr., Reaching 
inside the Genome, Reaching Farmers (2002), at 
www.cimmyt.org/ABC/map/about/BROCHURE97ABC/BROCHURE97ABC.ht
m (last visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
 21. For a discussion on how amounts of research can be calculated many 
different ways, see Paul W. Heisey et al., Public Sector Plant Breeding in a 
Privatizing World, AGRIC. INFO.  BULL. NO. 772, Mar. 2001, available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib772/; see also Robbin Shoemaker, et 
al., Economic Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO. 
762, Mar. 2001, at 38–39, available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib762/. 
 22. Heisey et al., supra note 21, at 6-8. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Id. at 8; see also  K.J. Frey, National Plant Breeding Study-I: Human 
and Financial Resources Devoted to Plant Breeding and Development in the 
United States in 1994, SPECIAL REPORT 98 IOWA AGRICULTURAL AND HOME 
ECONOMICS EXPERIMENT STATION (1996), available at http:// 
www.ers.usda.gov/data/plantbreeding/Plant%20Breeding.pdf. 
 25. Heisey et al., supra note 21, at 1. 
 26. Id. at 2. 
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economic incentive to use the laboratory tools or gene traits 
they own to develop solutions to developing country 
agricultural problems.27  The market infrastructure and 
opportunity required to earn rates of return that would be 
acceptable in Western financial markets simply do not exist in 
most developing countries.28 
Consequently, the finite capital resources of biotechnology 
companies will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be 
focused on meeting the needs of farmers in Western 
industrialized countries and will not be deployed in substantial 
measure to meet the needs of developing country farmers. 
If the benefits of cutting-edge advances in seed technology, 
based on modern biotechnology, are to reach the vast majority 
of African farmers, it will have to occur, for the foreseeable 
future, primarily through public and public-private cooperative 
channels.  Starting from this premise, the core policy questions 
we address in this article are whether and how U.S. patent 
policies could be changed to foster the development of 
biotechnology for African farmers through these channels. 
II. U.S. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ON PATENTS 
It is important to distinguish conceptually between 
“domestic” and “foreign” patent policies.  Domestic patent 
policy includes the rules governing what gets patented in the 
United States and how non-patentholders might gain access to 
patented technology.  The Constitution of the United States 
establishes the mandate for, and states the broad objective of 
the U.S. patent and trademark system: “The Congress shall 
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”29  The requirements and conditions for granting 
patents reflect the terms of the deal between the inventor and 
society.  Congress defined patentable subject matter in 35 
U.S.C. § 101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
                                                          
 27. Id. at 4; see also Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent 
Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 334 (2004). 
 28. Taylor & Cayford, supra note 27, at 334. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
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therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”30  These terms ensure that the inventor’s contribution to 
society has value.  Hence, there is a utility requirement, so 
society will receive a useful invention.31  There is a novelty 
requirement, so inventors cannot offer something that society 
already has.32  There is a nonobviousness requirement, so 
inventors cannot offer what society would likely soon have in 
any case: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the 
subject matter . . . and the prior art are such that the subject matter 
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.33 
There is also a disclosure or specification requirement, so 
that society actually receives the invention, in the sense that it 
becomes part of the common knowledge, usable by others.34 
Domestically, access to patented technology is also 
governed by the operation of the patent law, which gives the 
inventor a time-limited monopoly right to exploit the invention 
for economic gain.35  Patent holders typically transfer patented 
technology and reap economic gain through licensing or sale.  
However, access to patented technology may be hampered by 
the “patent thicket” problem: “an overlapping set of patent 
rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new 
technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.”36 
Domestic patent policy attempts to ease restrictions 
through such tools as research exemptions and compulsory 
license provisions.37  First, the utility patent statute does not 
                                                          
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. § 103(a). 
 34. See id. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of 
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . 
. to make and use the same . . . .). 
 35. See id. § 154(a)(2) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on the 
date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which 
the application for the patent was filed in the United States . . . .”). 
 36. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL. AND THE ECON. 119, in 
executive summary (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
 37. See JAMES LOVE AND MICHAEL PALMEDO, EXAMPLES OF COMPULSORY 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, at ch. III 
(2001) available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-cl.html (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2004). 
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explicitly allow researchers to use patented inventions freely in 
their research.  Courts have interpreted the law as implicitly 
exempting from infringement the use of patented inventions in 
non-commercial research.38  However, this exemption is narrow 
in that it does not permit the use of patented technology in the 
research and development of new technologies for use in 
commercial research or nonresearch settings.39  Second, 
compulsory licenses, like research exemptions, are tools for 
adjusting the balance between the private interests of the 
patent holder and a broader public interest by providing an 
exception from the exclusive rights normally provided by a 
patent.  U.S. law provides for compulsory licenses to make a 
technology available to ameliorate anticompetitive practices by 
patent holders.40 
While domestic patent policy  involves balancing competing 
interests (invention followed by dissemination and their 
respective benefits versus costs) within the United States, U.S. 
foreign policy on patents primarily addresses the rules and 
procedures through which patents are issued, and access to 
patented technologies is obtained in other countries.  It is 
better thought of as a species of U.S. foreign policy in the 
broader sense of the term, or, more specifically, as an element 
of U.S. trade and development policy.  Plainly put, it involves 
the one-dimensional task of pursuing the economic interest 
that the United States and U.S. technology companies have in 
a strong, global patent system.  The countervailing interests 
and costs fall largely within and upon other countries.  While, 
U.S. inventors gain the benefit of patent protection in other 
countries, the costs of that protection, such as higher prices and 
restricted access, are borne by individuals and businesses in 
the other country. 
The ways in which U.S. patent policy affects developing 
countries are complex and multifaceted.  They include domestic 
policies on what gets patented under U.S. patent law, including 
the direct and indirect effects of the patent thicket that has 
                                                          
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. The judicially-created research exemption was narrowed even 
further, perhaps to the point of eliminating it for practical purposes, by a 
recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding, in 
a case involving university researchers, that there was no protection from an 
infringement claim if the research was “in keeping with the alleged infringer’s 
legitimate business, regardless of commercial implications.”  Madey v. Duke 
Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
 40. Id. 
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grown up around biotechnology in the United States,41 and the 
rules governing non-domestic access to U.S.-patented 
technology. Developing countries are also affected by U.S. 
foreign policy on patents, which is grounded in a different set of 
interests and values arising outside the traditional confines of 
domestic patent law and policy.  It rests on the conviction that 
strong intellectual property protection is important to the 
economic success of U.S.-based technology companies, but it 
does not involve balancing the competing interests that are 
central to domestic patent policy.  The effects of domestic and 
international patent policies are difficult to measure, but in the 
view of many well-informed stakeholders, they can be 
substantial; and, in the future, developing country access to 
biotechnology for food-security purposes may be affected even 
more substantially by patent-related policies the U.S. 
government pursues in the international arena than by its 
domestic patent policies.  U.S. foreign policy on patents 
manifests itself in three main contexts: implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement,42 international harmonization of patent 
laws through the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO),43 and use of bilateral trade relationships to strengthen 
patent protections.44  We focus here on the TRIPS and WIPO 
arenas. 
The TRIPS agreement is, as its name implies, a trade 
                                                          
 41. See Shapiro, supra note 36. 
 42. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2004). 
 43. WIPO is the international standards setting group for patent and 
intellectual property matters.  World Intellectual Property Organization 
Website, at http://www.wipo.int (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).   
 44.  For example, in negotiating a free trade agreement with Singapore, 
the U.S. won provisions that require Singapore to adopt intellectual property 
protections that go beyond Singapore’s WTO and TRIPS obligations, including 
giving up the explicit flexibility in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS to choose not to 
grant utility patents for plants.  TRIPS, supra note 42.  According to a 
statement issued by the Singapore government: “The USSFTA will be a world-
class agreement.  Both sides will go way above their WTO commitments.  It 
will be NAFTA-plus in a number of areas including the protection of 
intellectual property . . . .” Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, at 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/FTA/frm_FTA_Default.asp?sid=36 (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2004).  
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agreement.45  It was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations that concluded in 1994 and created the 
WTO.  Its primary objective was to reduce impediments to 
trade, taking into account the need both to “promote effective 
and adequate” intellectual property rights, and to ensure that 
such rights do not themselves become barriers to trade.46 With 
respect to patents, a core requirement of TRIPS is that 
members provide for the patenting of all forms of technology in 
accordance with widely accepted principles of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and usefulness.47  Further, “national 
treatment” shall be accorded to all members; that is, member 
countries must permit nationals of other countries to obtain 
patents on terms no less favorable than those accorded to their 
own nationals.48 
The TRIPS Agreement explicitly recognizes the need of 
developing countries for “maximum flexibility” in implementing 
their patent laws in ways that enable them to create “a sound 
and viable technological base.”49  It contains several provisions 
that give countries the flexibility to grant exceptions to patent 
rights under certain circumstances, including broad authority 
in Article 30 to grant exceptions when the interests of the 
patent holder will not be adversely affected50 and authority in 
Article 31 to provide for compulsory licenses, subject to some 
conditions, when the patent holder’s interests are affected.51  
                                                          
 45. TRIPS, supra note 42. 
 46. Id. pmbl. 
 47. See id. art. 27.1 (“patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”). 
 48. Id. art. 3.1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. TRIPS, supra note 42, art. 30.  “Members may provide limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”  Id. 
 51. Article 31 provides in part: 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter 
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder . . . the 
following provisions shall be respected: . . . 
. . .  
 (g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate 
protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to 
be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to 
exist and are unlikely to recur. . . . 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the 
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Furthermore, Article 27.3(b) permits countries to exclude 
plants and animals from patentability altogether, if an 
alternative sui generis system of protection is provided.52  This 
flexibility is important for countries that might judge it in their 
interest to adopt a system of plant variety protection that 
allows for the use of protected plants for breeding of new 
varieties and for farmers to save their seed for planting the 
next year.  These provisions reflect the reality documented by 
expert commissions and commentators that the patent and 
other intellectual property needs of developing countries vary 
and can be sharply different from the needs of industrialized 
countries.53 
Nevertheless, the United States and other Western 
industrialized nations are leading a concerted effort through 
WIPO54 to achieve international harmonization of patent law 
beyond that provided for in TRIPS.  TRIPS only established 
minimum standards for adoption of patent systems by WTO 
                                                          
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of 
the authorization; . . . 
. . . 
(k) . . . Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse 
termination of authorization if and when the conditions which led to 
such authorization are likely to recur . . . .   
Id. art. 31. 
 52. Id. art. 27.3(b). 
 53. For a broad overview of this topic, see Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy (London, September 2002), at http://www.iprcommission.org (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2004).  For an analysis specifically addressing issues 
concerning TRIPS and development, see CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES: OPTIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (South Centre, Working Paper No. 5, 1999) at 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/complicence/toc.htm (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2004). 
 54. WIPO evolved out of two 19th century international conventions on 
intellectual property: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm 
[hereinafter Paris Convention], and the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/ 
wo/wo001en.htm.  It became a United Nations agency in 1974.  WIPO 
administers two main treaties.  One is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 
which seeks to harmonize standards for obtaining patents.  PCT, June 19, 
1970, http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf.  The other is the Patent 
Law Treaty, which aims to integrate the paperwork for obtaining patents and 
promote mutual recognition of patents among the treaty parties by ensuring 
that one international patent filing will have effect in all signatory countries.  
Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/ 
wo038en.htm. 
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members and left considerable flexibility to tailor the system to 
local needs.  WIPO is focusing on a more standardized “one size 
fits all” approach to patents that would support the move 
toward a single patent application establishing patent rights to 
an invention worldwide.  WIPO’s strategic goals are similar to 
those of the PTO, including “maintenance and further 
development of the respect of intellectual property throughout 
the world” and ensuring that acquiring and enforcing patents 
“should be simpler, cheaper and more secure.”55  Having many 
patent offices review applications on essentially the same 
invention is a duplication of effort that is costly to patent offices 
and patent applicants.  In November 2000, WIPO launched its 
Patent Agenda, which is an effort to integrate and extend the 
two aforementioned treaties in the form of a new one, to be 
called the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT).  The 
objectives of the SLPT are to harmonize the basic legal 
principles that govern the issuance of patents, such as the 
definitions of “prior art” and utility, so that: 
[A]pplicants, in all contracting parties of the SPLT, are subject to the 
same substantive conditions for the grant of patents and for the 
invalidation of granted patents.  Such harmonization would lead to 
lower costs for applicants and patent offices by contributing to a 
future reduction in the duplication of search and examination work.56 
If successful, WIPO’s approach to harmonization could 
hinder developing countries in adopting patent regimes tailored 
to their particular needs, including the need to foster 
dissemination of biotechnology for food-security purposes.  
Specifically, some commentators have expressed concern that 
this “universal concept of patentability” would require the 
patenting by developing countries of technologies that it might 
not be in their interest to patent and for which patents could be 
rejected under the terms of the current TRIPS agreement.57  As 
one commentator observed: 
[O]ne of the most significant issues on which some developing 
countries expressed their position . . . was whether an invention 
                                                          
 55. Memorandum of the WIPO Director General, Vision and Strategic 
Direction of WIPO, at http://www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/dgo/pub487.htm (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
 56. Press Release, WIPO, Progress on Discussions to Harmonize Patent 
Law, Update 164/2002 (May 14, 2002), at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/ 
updates/2002/upd164.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
 57. See Carlos Correa, WIPO’s Patent Agenda:  For Whom, S. BULL. 48, 
available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin48/bulletin48-01.htm 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
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should show a “technical character” in order to be patentable. The 
United States argued—supported by the Representatives of some of 
the users group NGOs—that “requiring a technical character was 
unnecessarily limiting the innovations in new fields of endeavour, 
such as information technology and biotechnology, and that the term 
in all fields of technology” which appeared in Article 27.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement was not mandating any requirement relating to 
technical character . . . .”58 
In sum, dropping the requirement of “technical character” 
of inventions would substantially expand the scope of the 
patent system, beyond its basic intent of promoting technical 
progress.  Such a step will go well beyond the TRIPS 
Agreement (which only prescribes patenting in “fields of 
technology”) and the current PCT, according to which the 
invention must be of “technical character.”59 
III. THE CASE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR POLICY CHANGE 
The United States cannot solve the world’s technological 
and economic problems by itself, but the United States has a 
national security interest in reducing global poverty and 
hunger.  It also has a duty, as the richest and most powerful 
country in the world, to avoid actions and policies that have 
unnecessary and avoidable adverse impacts on progress 
elsewhere.  This includes patent policies that adversely affect 
food security in developing countries.  Indeed, U.S. patents and 
patent policy contribute to the difficulties researchers face in 
applying biotechnology to the solution of food security problems 
in developing countries.  Enforcement of U.S. patents can 
directly block U.S. researchers’ access to a technology either as 
a legal bar to unlicensed use of a patented technology or 
through the proliferation of upstream patents on research tools 
described above as the “patent thicket.”60  It can also directly 
impede researchers working in developing countries on 
applications of biotechnology to crops intended to be exported to 
                                                          
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  “The process of harmonizing “the rules and procedures of a wide 
majority of countries with the practices and legislation of a small number of 
countries . . . [c]ould represent, in reality, a step-backwards from the limited 
aspects of flexibility stipulated in the TRIPS agreement.”  The WIPO Patent 
Agenda Must Promote Development, S. BULL. 48 (adapted from the statement 
of the Egyptian delegation at the 37th series of Meetings of the Assemblies of 
Member States of WIPO),  at 
http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin48/bulletin48-02.htm 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
 60. See Shapiro, supra note 36. 
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the U.S.  If such crops are produced with unlicensed U.S.-
patented technology, importing these crops into the U.S. would 
constitute an infringement of the patent.   
Because researchers and research institutions in 
developing countries frequently cannot navigate through the 
patent thicket, the possibility that the crop will be exported to 
the U.S. acts as a legal obstacle and disincentive for developing 
country researchers to use U.S.-patented technologies.  For 
researchers working outside the U.S. on crops with little or no 
export potential, use of a U.S.-patented tool for such an 
improved plant is not directly blocked by U.S. patents which 
are binding only in the U.S.  Nevertheless, there are several 
ways U.S. patents may have an indirect impact on the use of 
patented technology by these researchers.  First, the U.S. 
government pushes hard for foreign countries and institutions 
to protect the intellectual property rights of U.S. companies, 
and systematic violation of U.S. patents may jeopardize 
funding by the U.S. government and international financial 
institutions.  Further, developing country research institutions 
using unlicensed patented technology may find that the 
Western biotechnology companies unwilling to provide much 
needed cooperation.  These Western biotechnology companies 
jealously guard their patents and are less likely to cooperate 
with institutions that do not respect their patents.61  Finally, if 
foreign researchers desire to form partnerships with patent-
holders to gain access to enabling technologies and necessary 
know-how, they generally must enter material transfer 
agreements (MTAs) that place strict restrictions on the use of 
the technology.62  The leverage to impose strict MTA conditions 
can operate as a de facto extension of the patent to the country 
where the researcher works: to the extent the researcher was 
legally free to use the invention outside the U.S., that freedom 
is usually lost in the material transfer agreement. 
If the United States believes biotechnology can help 
improve agriculture and food security in developing countries, 
                                                          
 61. See John Komen, International Collaboration in Agricultural 
Biotechnology, in MANAGING AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: ADDRESSING 
RESEARCH NEEDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 110, 117-19, (Joel I. Cohen ed., 
1999), available at ftp://ftp.cgiar.org/isnar/ibs/III_10.pdf. 
 62. See Steven C. Price, Public and Private Plant Breeding, 17 NATURE 
BIOTECH. 938 (1999), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/ 
public_private.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2004); Charles Benbrook, Who 
Controls and Who Will Benefit from Plant Genomics?, Feb. 19, 2000, at 
http://www.biotech-info.net/AAASgen.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
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and if U.S. patent policy can impede such improvement, policy 
change should be considered.  The case for policy change is well 
grounded in the fundamental social purpose of the patent 
system, which grants patents to serve society’s interests in both 
the invention and dissemination of innovative technology.  The 
theoretical underpinnings of the U.S. patent system codified in 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, and 112 have been discussed above in 
the beginning of Part II.63  The patent system is an 
instrumental social construct intended to benefit society by 
fostering useful innovation.  This understanding of the system 
requires us to evaluate its performance from a social outcome 
perspective.  From this perspective, the success of the patent 
system and possible changes in patent policy are fairly judged 
on the basis of whether and to what extent the societal benefits 
of the system, in terms of useful innovation, exceed the societal 
costs of the patent monopoly, in terms of higher prices to 
consumers or constraints on access to new inventions by those 
not holding patents.64  If the patent system is not achieving this 
objective or could achieve it better, it is fair and appropriate to 
consider policy change.  Patent policies should be changed if the 
changes will improve dissemination for food security or other 
important social purposes without significantly undercutting 
incentives for invention. 
While some may argue that it is unfair to maintain that  
an international concern—food security in developing 
countries—is a societal interest against which U.S patent 
policy is fairly judged,  the United States has chosen to bring 
international concerns in general, and food security in 
developing countries in particular, within the legitimate scope 
of domestic patent policy making.  As previously noted, U.S. 
patents and patent policy have extraterritorial aspirations and 
impacts, including practical impacts on access to technology in 
other countries.  Furthermore, it is the declared objective of the 
PTO to promote adoption of U.S.-like patent systems in other 
countries, including developing countries.65 
                                                          
 63. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Lester C. Thurow, Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Sep.-Oct. 1997 HARV. BUS. REV. 95; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents: 
Help or Hindrance to Technology Transfer, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE, 
ENGINEERING, AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
161, (Frederick B. Rudolph & Larry V. McIntire eds., 1996); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 2081 (2000). 
 65. See James E. Rogan, Remarks at the Hearings on Competition and 
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A set of possible changes in U.S. patent policy that appear 
to meet the social outcome balancing test is outlined below.  
They fall into three categories: changing U.S. law and policy to 
improve access to patented technologies; preserving the 
flexibility developing countries have in the current TRIPS 
Agreement to tailor their patent systems to their local needs; 
and more fully implementing Article 66.2 of TRIPS regarding 
support for technology transfer.66  Most of the changes to U.S. 
law considered are designed to improve access to patented 
technology specifically for developing country food security 
purposes.  This narrow focus limits special access to cases in 
which that benefit is achieved without directly competing with 
the patent holder in the market (the United States) for which 
the patent was granted. 
The discussion is limited to a brief summary of each 
possible policy change, because its primary purpose is to make 
a simple point: if one accepts as a matter of principle that it is 
appropriate to consider access to biotechnology for developing 
country food-security purposes when formulating U.S. patent 
policy, there are a number of policy alternatives that appear to 
meet the threshold test of improving access without 
significantly undercutting invention incentives. 
 
                                                          
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Feb. 
6, 2002, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/comm06feb2002.html (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2004).  “[T]he United States has made it a key part of its trade 
policy to create international frameworks for recognizing intellectual property 
rights.”  Id.; see also A New Organization for a New Millennium, supra note 8, 
at 15.  “Many developing countries were also provided technical assistance by 
the USPTO to help them implement their obligations under the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPs).”  Id.   
As the largest intellectual property office in the world, the PTO is at 
the forefront of developing and strengthening intellectual property 
protection, both at home and abroad.  The Undersecretary and 
Director is the organization’s standard-bearer of intellectual property 
rights protection in the global arena, advocating more efficient and 
cost-effective means of protecting the IP rights of U.S. nationals 
throughout the world.   
Id. at 19. 
 66. “Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises 
and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and 
encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order 
to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” TRIPS, supra 
note 42, art. 66.2. 
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IV. IMPROVING ACCESS TO PATENTED TECHNOLOGIES 
Five domestic patent policy alternatives that are worthy of 
consideration are outlined below.  They involve a research 
exemption, compulsory licensing, a working requirement, use of 
eminent domain authority, and placement of U.S. government-
funded technology in the public domain.  All involve expanding 
access to patented technologies, rather than changing what 
gets patented. 
A. CREATE A STRONG RESEARCH EXEMPTION 
Under this policy alternative, Congress would enact a 
statutory limitation on the scope of the patent monopoly such 
that the use of a patented tool of biotechnology in the research 
and development of new applications for developing country 
food-security purposes would not constitute infringement of the 
patent.  The proposal would improve access to patented 
biotechnology by freeing both U.S. and foreign-based 
researchers to work on applying patented technology to 
developing country food-security problems without concern 
about infringement claims.  Such a research and development 
exemption as envisioned would not be limited to non-
commercial users or uses of patented technology.  The 
exemption is, however, only for research.  If that research 
produces new products that contain the original patented 
invention or that cannot be exploited without infringing the 
original patent, the patent holder would retain full control of 
the original invention.  Accordingly, the exploitation of such 
dependent products would still require permission from the 
patent holder. 
B. ESTABLISH A COMPULSORY LICENSE REQUIREMENT FOR 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY  
This policy alternative would add to U.S. patent law a 
procedure to grant nonexclusive licenses to any requesting 
party for the use of any patented tool of biotechnology for 
developing country food security purposes.  Royalties would be 
set at rates (including zero) that reflect the extent of the 
reasonably foreseeable value forgone by the patent holder, 
taking into account the likelihood of the patent holder’s 
commercialization of the technology for the developing country 
purpose.  Such a compulsory license provision would improve 
access by ensuring that any patented tool of biotechnology 
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could be used for developing country food-security purposes 
without risk of patent infringement.  But it would not 
significantly undercut invention incentives because the royalty 
provision would make the patent holder economically whole to 
the extent it would lose economic value from its own 
application of the technology for developing country food-
security purposes. 
C. ESTABLISH A “WORKING” REQUIREMENT FOR AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 
A “working” requirement is a condition on the right to 
exclude others from using a patented invention: it limits the 
exclusion right to only those applications of the invention that 
the patent holder is actually working or exploiting.  This policy 
alternative would add to U.S. patent law a working 
requirement for patented biotechnology: if, within three years 
of the patent’s issuance, the patent holder has not worked the 
patent for a specific developing country purpose, or has not 
made it readily available by license to those who seek to use it 
for that purpose, any party could apply to a designated 
authority for a nonexclusive license authorizing use for such a 
purpose. 
This provision is modeled on the “working” provision in the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property.  
Article 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention states: 
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure 
to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of 
four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three 
years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period 
expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by 
legitimate reasons.  Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive 
and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-
license, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which 
exploits such license.67 
The TRIPS Agreement requires compliance with the Paris 
Convention, first enacted in 1883, which permits, but does not 
demand, a working requirement.  The United States is a 
signatory of the Paris Convention, but, unlike most other 
countries, it has not adopted a working requirement.  A 
working requirement along these lines would improve access by 
ensuring that, after a certain waiting period, patented tools of 
biotechnology would be available for developing country food-
                                                          
 67. Paris Convention, supra note 54, art. 5(A)(4). 
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security purposes without risk of patent infringement.  Again, 
it would not significantly undercut invention incentives, 
because it would limit access to cases in which the patent 
holder chose not to apply the invention to the specific 
developing country food-security need in question. 
D. EXERCISE U.S. EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY 
Under this policy alternative, the U.S. government would 
exercise its existing statutory eminent domain authority under 
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to authorize the use of patented tools of 
biotechnology for developing country food-security purposes.  
Eminent domain authority has existed in U.S. patent law since 
1910.68  Under the government’s eminent domain authority, 
government authorization of the use of a patented technology 
insulates a user from any patent infringement claim by the 
patent holder.  There are no subject matter, purpose, or other 
substantive restrictions on the uses of the technology for which 
eminent domain authority may be exercised, and there is no 
requirement for formal action by the government to invoke it.69  
The existing eminent domain authority has been used 
primarily for military purposes, although its use was 
considered recently in a health context to make the anthrax 
drug CIPRO® available more cheaply.70  Eminent domain 
authority has not been exercised with respect to patents on the 
tools of agricultural biotechnology. 
A designated authority within the U.S. government could 
establish an administrative mechanism under which a 
technology developer who wanted to use the patented 
technology could make application and then be deemed to be 
using the technology for the United States.  The U.S. 
government, rather than the technology developer, would then 
be liable for any compensation to which the patent holder could 
prove entitlement in court. 
E. MAKE AVAILABLE U.S. GOVERNMENT-FUNDED OR 
                                                          
 68. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1948)). 
 69. See, e.g., Bereslavsky v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 175 F.2d 148, 150-51 
(4th Cir. 1949). 
 70. See Consumer Project on Technology, Ciprofloxacin: the Dispute over 
Compulsory Licenses (noting recent publicity in international media 
concerning the use of eminent domain power over the CIPRO patent), at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
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GOVERNMENT-OWNED BIOTECHNOLOGY 
This alternative would establish as a matter of policy that 
all tools of agricultural biotechnology developed by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other U.S. government 
agencies, whether patented or not, would be made available by 
the government, without the need for a license or other 
permission, when used for developing country food-security 
purposes.  The USDA and other government agencies fund 
research in their own laboratories and in academic facilities 
that sometimes leads to patented tools or applications of 
agricultural biotechnology.  The Bayh-Dole Act71 encourages 
the patenting of government-funded research as a means of 
fostering its dissemination and use, and USDA’s current patent 
policy is based on the goal of making government-developed 
technology available for development and application.72 
This is consistent with the patent law, which declares: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system 
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development . . . to ensure that the 
Government obtains sufficient rights to federally supported 
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the 
public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions . . . .73  
 This declaration of policy is backed up by restrictions on 
the granting of exclusive or partially exclusive licenses on 
government-owned inventions, including requiring that “the 
Federal agency finds that the public will be served by the 
granting of the license . . . and that the proposed scope of 
exclusivity is not greater than reasonably necessary.”74  On 
inventions owned by a private party but whose development 
was funded by the government under a cooperative research 
and development agreement (CRADA), the Bayh-Dole Act 
grants the government a license in the inventions to be 
exercised “[a]s necessary for meeting the obligations of the 
United States under any treaty, international agreement, 
arrangement of cooperation, memorandum of understanding, or 
similar arrangement.”75  The Rome Declaration issued at the 
                                                          
 71. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000) (commonly known as the 
“Bayh-Dole Act”). 
 72. USDA, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN ARS, 141.2-ARS (Sept. 11, 2000), 
at  http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/141-2.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 73.  35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(2) (2000). 
 75.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000). 
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World Food Summit of 1996 and signed by the United States, 
says, “We pledge our actions and support to implement the 
World Food Summit Plan of Action.”76 To date, the United 
States has not exercised its retained licenses on CRADA-
funded technology to advance the food security purposes of the 
World Food Summit. 
IV. PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 The key issue in U.S. foreign policy on patents is the 
degree to which the United States will support the preservation 
and use of the flexibility now built into the TRIPS Agreement 
for developing countries to fashion patent regimes that serve 
their local technology and development needs.  The United 
States has been ambivalent at best on this question, supporting 
TRIPS in general and touting its flexibility in dealing with 
access to drugs for HIV/AIDS, while pursuing through WIPO 
and bilateral and regional trade negotiations a more stringent 
approach to harmonization.  To help ensure access to 
biotechnology for developing country food-security purposes 
without undercutting invention incentives, the United States 
could support preservation and use of developing country 
flexibility in several ways. 
A. SUPPORT INCORPORATING TRIPS FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS IN 
ANY NEW WIPO AGREEMENT AND IN ANY BILATERAL OR 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 The TRIPS Agreement provides significant flexibility for 
developing countries to devise patent regimes that serve their 
local technology and development needs.  The United States 
could support the inclusion of these same general flexibility 
provisions in the draft WIPO Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
and oppose any efforts through the WIPO process to reduce the 
patent policy flexibility granted developing countries in the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Similarly, it could accept the inclusion of 
these flexibility provisions in any trade agreements it 
negotiates with developing countries, reversing the trend 
against flexibility set in its recent agreements with Singapore 
and Chile.77  Perhaps more simply, the United States could 
                                                          
 76. Rome Declaration on World Food Security, Nov. 13-17, 1996, at 
www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm. 
 77. See Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, at 
TAYLOR_S6 12/29/2004  2:08:10 PM 
302 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:1 
 
refrain from incorporating any intellectual-property provisions 
at all in new trade agreements with developing countries 
already bound by TRIPS. 
B. SUPPORT PRESERVING THE TRIPS FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS 
 The TRIPS Council is reviewing the TRIPS Agreement in 
the context of the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations.78  
The United States could make clear in this review that it 
supports maintaining the current flexibility provisions in the 
TRIPS Agreement.  There are many such provisions, including: 
the broad authority in Article 30 to grant benign exceptions to 
patents; the Article 27.3(b) explicit right to exclude plants and 
animals from patentable subject matter; the implicit right to 
set patentability standards (novelty, inventive step, utility, 
disclosure) so as to maximize disclosure, minimize patenting of 
discoveries, and narrow patent breadth; and the right to grant 
compulsory licenses.79 
C. ENDORSE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 8 AND 30 TO FOOD 
SECURITY NEEDS 
 By their terms, Articles 8 and 30, as well as other 
flexibility provisions in TRIPS, are available to allow 
developing countries to devise intellectual property approaches 
to agricultural biotechnology that best serve local food-security 
needs.80  The United States could specifically endorse the use of 
these provisions for that purpose and support efforts to craft 
implementation schemes for these provisions that comply with 
TRIPS, meet the food-security need, and preserve invention 
incentives. 
D. SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE RETENTION AND USE OF ARTICLE 
27.3(B) IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
 Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS explicitly allows countries to 
exclude plants from patentability, provided they establish an 
                                                          
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/FTA/frm_FTA_Default.asp?sid=36 (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2004). 
 78.  WTO Ministerial Conference, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (01)/ 
DEC/1, ¶ 19 (Nov. 20, 2001), at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 79.  TRIPS, supra note 42, arts. 3.1, 27.1, 27.3, 30, 31. 
 80.  Id. arts. 8, 30. 
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effective alternative for protecting plant varieties.81  This 
flexibility is vital for countries that rely on publicly funded 
breeding programs and on the saving and reuse of seed by 
farmers to develop and disseminate new seed varieties.  The 
United States could endorse retention of this provision and 
support its use in ways that meet developing country food-
security needs without undercutting invention incentives. 
E. FULLY IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 66.2 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement says: 
Developed countries shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and 
encouraging technology transfer to least developed country members 
in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological 
base.82 
 This provision speaks directly to the disparity in 
innovation capacity and access to technology between 
developed and developing countries.  It was part of the quid pro 
quo in the TRIPS negotiations, in which developing countries 
were to be provided assistance with technology transfer in 
exchange for establishing the patent systems that developed 
countries were seeking to protect their intellectual property.  
The perception among many in developing countries is that, 
while they are working to establish patent systems, the 
developed countries have not met their technology transfer 
obligations.83 
 The United States has not taken steps targeted specifically 
at providing incentives to U.S. companies to transfer 
agricultural technologies to developing countries for food-
security purposes.  Rather, the United States report to the 
WTO on its compliance with Article 66.2 recites several U.S. 
statutes and programs, most predating the TRIPS Agreement, 
that relate generally to technology transfer and trade 
development, and it identifies some capacity-building programs 
in areas of technology unrelated to agriculture and food 
security.84  Nor has it taken any steps to provide incentives to 
                                                          
 81.  Id. art. 27.3. 
 82.  Id. art. 66.2. 
 83. See WTO, Committee on Trade & Development, Special and 
Differential Treatment Provisions: Joint Communication from the African 
Group in the WTO, TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.1 (June 24, 2002), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/tn/ctd/W3R1.doc. 
 84.  WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: Information 
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U.S. companies to transfer patented technology, such as the 
tools of biotechnology.85  The United States could work to fulfill 
its obligation under Article 66.2 with respect to agricultural 
biotechnology and food security by providing incentives, 
perhaps in the form of tax credits or other economic subsidies, 
for companies to invest in the development and 
commercialization of applications of biotechnology that meet 
developing country food security needs.    However, the market 
incentives for such commercial investment do not exist on a 
viable scale in developing countries, and there is little 
commercial infrastructure for the delivery of seeds where they 
are needed for food security purposes.  Government incentives 
on any reasonably foreseeable scale are thus not likely to make 
a significant or sustainable difference in the availability of 
improved seeds to improve food security.  Moreover, subsidizing 
commercial applications of biotechnology is not likely to 
advance Article 66.2’s objective of enabling developing 
countries “to create a sound and viable technological base” of 
their own.86 
 A course more likely to achieve the objectives of Article 
66.2 would be to provide incentives to U.S. companies to 
transfer the tools of biotechnology and other agricultural 
technologies to public and private sector researchers based in 
developing countries, who can apply them to local food security 
problems following a public-private collaborative approach.  A 
model for the public-private innovation channel is the newly 
founded, nonprofit African Agricultural Technology Foundation 
(AATF).  With start-up funding from The Rockefeller 
Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International 
                                                          
from Developed Country Members, Addendum: United States, 
IP/C/W/388/Add.7 (Feb. 4, 2003), at docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/ 
t/IP/C/W388A7.doc. 
 85. Although Article 66.2 does not explicitly state that the technology that 
developed countries must encourage their private sectors to transfer should be 
patented technology, this is implicit in its being an article within TRIPS, 
which is an agreement about intellectual property.  This implication is 
strongly reinforced in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, which created the obligation for developed countries to file 
reports on their compliance with Article 66.2, and which explicitly reminds 
countries that “each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the 
light of the object and purpose of the Agreement.”  WT Ministerial Conference, 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 
¶ 5(a) (Nov. 20, 2001), at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments 
/t/WT/min01/DEC2.doc. 
 86.  TRIPS, supra note 42, art. 66.2. 
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Development, the AATF was established specifically to identify 
and facilitate the royalty-free transfer of proprietary 
technologies that meet the needs of resource-poor African 
farmers in ways that address and resolve the concerns of 
technology providers, including concerns related to intellectual 
property, protection of commercially important markets, and 
liability.87  The United States could develop an agenda of 
concrete actions to encourage and support the transfer of 
technology from U.S.-based technology owners to those who can 
make good use of it for developing country food-security 
purposes, through AATF and similar organizations. 
Implementation of Article 66.2 in these focused ways would 
contribute directly to solving the technology access problem.  It 
would complement the creation of a policy framework that 
reduces obstacles to access, but it is not an adequate substitute 
for policy change.  Developing countries need the flexibility to 
develop intellectual-property systems that strike the right 
balance between inducing and rewarding invention and 
ensuring that inventions are put to practical uses that meet 
local needs.  Full implementation of Article 66.2 can help, but, 
for purposes of gaining access to the tools they need to achieve 
basic food security, developing countries should not be 
dependent solely on decisions made in Washington or by 
biotechnology companies. 
CONCLUSION 
The countries of sub-Saharan Africa face daunting social, 
economic, and health challenges.  Achieving basic food security 
is the central one for many countries and individuals in that 
region.  If basic nutritional needs are not being met, the 
consequences are seen, certainly, in individual suffering, but 
also in the failure of societies to thrive socially and 
economically.  Food security, economic development, and 
poverty reduction are thoroughly intertwined.  So too are the 
interests of the United States and developing countries in 
Africa and elsewhere.  In the post-September 11 environment, 
U.S. leaders increasingly recognize that the lack of food 
security outside the United States is related to our quest for 
physical security inside the United States. 
There is also an increasing recognition in the U.S. media 
                                                          
 87. The African Agricultural Technology Foundation, Who We Are, at 
http://www.aftechfound.org/who.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
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and policy circles that a wide range of U.S. policies affects the 
efforts of developing countries to address food security and 
other basic development problems.  These include U.S. 
agricultural and trade policies, development assistance and 
food aid policies, and the approaches the United States takes in 
the international arena to address trade and other 
development-related policy issues. 
 Patent policy is an important part of this picture.  We 
document in this article the relationship between U.S. patents 
and patent policy and the opportunity of developing countries 
to access the latest technology to meet their food-security 
needs.  Based on our analysis, there are changes the United 
States could make in both its domestic and foreign policies that 
would improve developing country access to the patented tools 
of biotechnology without significantly undercutting the core 
invention incentives of the patent system.  These changes 
deserve consideration as the United States grapples with its 
heightened national interest in global food security and works 
to build a harmonized global patent system that embraces the 
needs of developed and developing countries alike. 
